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Clergy Malpractice: Avoiding Earthly Judgment 
Thomas F. Taylor* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professional malpractice is a tort1 in which a person with superior 
knowledge or skill above that held by the general community injures 
someone else by misusing that skill or knowledge. The law requires 
that professionals, including doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers, 
and others, act with the level of skill and learning commonly possessed 
by the members of their profession in good standing. 2 In recent years, a 
few American courts have indicated that clergy3 may be added to this 
list of professionals.• As yet, no published court opinion has formally 
• Associate, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah; B.A. 1982, University 
of Illinois; M.Div. 1987, Yale University, Divinity School; J.D. 1990, University of Illinois. The 
author served from 1985 to 1987 as Assistant Minister of Saint Michael's Luthern Church in 
New Canaan, Connecticut, and acted as a visiting-lecturer for the Department of Religious Stud-
ies at the University of Illinois-Urbana from 1988 to 1990. The author thanks Professor Gerard 
Bradley and Associate Professor Andrew Merritt of the University of Illinois Law School for their 
creative insights and critical reviews of this article in its preliminary stage. The author also thanks 
the Brighen Young University Journal of Public Law staff for their assistance in preparing the 
article. 
I. A tort is "(a] private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract for which a 
court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 
1335 (5th ed. 1979). Although unnecessary for the legal community, this definition has been in-
cluded for the convenience of nonlegal readers. 
2. See e.g., W. KEETON, D. DoBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
ToRTS§ 32, at 185-93 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. The authors point out 
that persons holding themselves out as professionals are held to a higher standard of care than 
ordinary persons. 
3. The terms "clergy" and "cleric" as used in this article refer to any person ordained, li-
censed, or otherwise empowered by a church, synagogue, or sect to offer spiritual counseling or 
guidance. The definition of spiritual counseling is a matter of some controversy and is dealt with 
later. See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. 
4. The most notable "clergy malpractice" case is Nally v. Grace Community Church of the 
Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 
(1989). Since Nally, other state courts have wrestled with the validity of the clergy malpractice 
remedy. The Utah Court of Appeals, citing Nally, declined to establish a cause of action for clergy 
malpractice so as to impose a duty on a Mormon bishop to make further inquiries into family 
conflicts alleged by a minor, and then, if beyond his expertise, refer the minor to others who are 
qualified to treat such problems. White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1318-19 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). The Colorado Supreme Court flatly rejected the remedy of clergy malpractice, finding it 
unconstitutional. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988). The Ohio Supreme Court 
refused to find clergy malpractice where a plaintiff alleged intentional misconduct on the part of a 
119 
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recognized a cause of action for clergy malpractice. However, some 
courts have acknowledged that malpractice actions or negligence claims, 
which would otherwise amount to malpractice, may be applied to the 
clergy in certain circumstances. 11 
Commentators have written widely on the subject but have 
reached no consensus.6 Those who favor the creation of a clergy mal-
practice tort suggest that church leaders should not receive special im-
munity from the standards demanded of other professionals. 7 Those op-
posing clergy malpractice actions commonly argue that it is impossible 
to create a standard of care for clergy which will not violate constitu-
tional rights, such as the right to free exercise of religion. 8 Also, critics 
of clergy malpractice actions fear that recognition of this tort would 
chill communications between the clergy and parishioners who seek 
counseling. 9 
These arguments over the issue of clergy malpractice have left 
clergy confused about how to proceed in a variety of circumstances re-
lated to their profession. The courts and legislatures have generally 
failed to offer more sharply defined answers on what might constitute 
malpractice by the clergy. 
This article surveys the present discussions on clergy malprac-
tice.10 Section II attempts to define the cause of action as nearly as it 
minister. Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988). A dissenting opinion in 
Strock noted that malpractice is a viable action against clergy who are negligent in counseling, 
stating, however, that "clergy malpractice" is a misnomer because the standards for such actions 
are the same for both secular and religious counselors in the marriage counseling context. /d. at 
217-21, 527 N.E.2d at 1244-47 (Sweeney, J., dissenting). Finally, one justice of the Alabama 
Supreme Court indicated that clergy malpractice may be a viable remedy in that state, although 
that court declined to find such malpractice where plaintiff alleged intentional, not negligent, mis-
conduct. Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987) (per curiam) (Maddox, J., concurring 
specially) (1988). 
5. See, e.g., Lund v. Caple, 100 Wash. 2d 739, 744, 675 P.2d 226, 231 (1984) (en bane) 
(court noted that "a malpractice action would be appropriate where a counselor fails to conform to 
an appropriate standard of care"); Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 100 n.8, 763 P.2d at 961 n.8, 253 Cal. 
Rptr. at 110 n.8 (court noted its opinion "did not foreclose imposing liability on nontherapist 
counselors, who hold themselves out as professionals, for injuries related to their counseling 
activities"). 
6. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
7. See Barker, Clergy Negligence: Are juries Ready to Sit in judgment?, 22 TRIAL, July 
1986, at 56. Barker was plaintiffs' attorney in Nally. 
8. See, e.g., Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Ac-
tion for Improper Counseling by a Clergyman?, 92 DICKENSON L. REv. 223, 251 (1987). 
9. Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outra-
geous Conduct Be "Free Exercise"?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1308 (1986). 
10. This article is only a survey of clergy malpractice and is not intended as a tome on the 
constitutional concerns of imposing liability upon clergy for their counseling activities. See Esbeck, 
Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 
89 W. VA. L. REv. 2 (1986). Other related issues important to the discussion of clergy malprac-
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has been defined by the courts and distinguish it from other tort claims 
brought against religious organizations and leaders. Section III dis-
cusses the advantages and disadvantages of creating clergy malpractice 
liability actions. Section IV sets forth the most problematic issues on 
the subject and discusses the likelihood of future acceptance of a clergy 
malpractice action. Section V suggests some preventative measures for 
clergy to consider until judicial or legislative powers speak more clearly 
regarding their legal obligations. Finally, section VI concludes that fu-
ture malpractice actions against clergy are likely and suggests that the 
prudent course of action for clergy is to behave as if such an action 
already exists. 
II. DEFINING CLERGY MALPRACTICE 
Generally, tort claims against professionals fall into one of two 
broad categories: intentional or negligence claims. Intentional tort 
claims require a plaintiff to prove that a defendant intentionally or de-
liberately committed an act which injured the plaintiff. Negligence 
claims require a plaintiff to prove the existence and breach of a duty 
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. Professional malpractice claims 
are a specialized type of negligence in which it must be shown that the 
professional's conduct breached the standards of the profession. 11 
Some courts have noted that to be a separately viable claim, clergy 
malpractice must fall outside the scope of other recognized torts which 
can be, and have been, levied against clergy .12 Courts have recently 
dismissed claims of clergy malpractice because the plaintiffs did not dis-
tinguish that claim from other tort claims.13 The rationale is that if 
other intentional or negligence tort claims already exist which suffice to 
hold clergy liable for their injurious acts or omissions, there is no rea-
son to create a new tort claim of clergy malpractice. Thus, to determine 
whether clergy malpractice is a definable, viable cause of action, it must 
tice include respondeat superior (liability of a church for injuries caused by that church's clergy) 
and vicarious liability which might occur while a lay group is using church facilities. While these 
are interesting and important issues, they are beyond the scope of this article. 
II. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, §32, at 185-93. 
12. See, e.g., Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988). 
13. Id. See also Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987) (per curiam) (Maddox, J., 
concurring specially). There is some indication that the courts' unwillingness to recognize clergy 
malpractice claims is based on a fear that such an allowance would open a flood of suits against 
clerics, a group of people who could not afford to defend themselves in court. See Girdner, To Err 
Is Human, 5 CAL. LAw, Aug. 1985, at 21. This flood of suits, however, has not happened in the 
related counseling fields of psychiatry and psychology. Significantly few suits have been filed 
against those professionals and have only been filed when such a professional acts outrageously. 
See Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 137, 139 n.13 (1986). 
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be distinguished from other tort claims which a plaintiff may bring 
against a member of the clergy. 
A. Distinguishing Clergy Malpractice from Other Tort Ac-
tions-What Clergy Malpractice Is Not 
1. Tort claims against religious leaders or groups clearly distinct 
from clergy malpractice 
Carl Esbeck, a professor at the University of Missouri Law 
School, has written a detailed and thorough article on tort claims 
against churches and the first amendment implications of those 
claims.14 Professor Esbeck discusses a litany of tort claims which have 
been raised (many of them successfully) against church officials, help-
ing to distinguish clergy malpractice from other torts with which clergy 
malpractice might otherwise be confused. 
Professor Esbeck identifies at least four types of tort claims 
brought against churches or church officials that fall outside the bounds 
of clergy malpractice: (1) claims regarding church discipline, (2) tort 
claims arising outside the course of counseling and discipline, (3) reli-
gious fraud claims, and ( 4) alleged "mind control" claims. 111 These four 
claims are reviewed below. 
a. Claims regarding church discipline. According to Professor Es-
beck, there are two kinds of claims arising from church discipline: (1) 
claims by clergy or church officials, such as deacons, board members, 
and lay pastors, who have been disciplined or removed from office and 
who allege they were defamed/6 and (2) tort claims by church mem-
bers who have been disciplined by church officials. 17 The second kind 
of claim often involves defamation, invasion of privacy, and either in-
tentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. 18 Both types of 
claims are based on distinct torts, separate from malpractice. 
b. Tort claims arising outside the course of counseling and disci-
pline. Tort claims arising outside the course of counseling and disci-
pline involve slanderous and libelous publications. The allegedly de-
famatory communication is either directed against a church member or 
official, or against a party wholly unconnected with the church. For 
example, a church member may sue church leaders if they falsely or 
maliciously publicly shamed him or her with slanderous statements 
14. Esbeck, supra note 10. 
15. /d. at 91-113. 
16. /d. at 91-97. 
17. /d. at 98-99. 
18. /d. 
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before the congregation.19 A party unrelated to the church may also sue 
the church or its officials who slander the plaintiff before the general 
public. In Church of Scientology v. Blackman,20 a psychiatrist filed a 
suit against a church alleging that the church officials damaged the psy-
chiatrist's reputation by demonstrating outside his office, criticizing his 
use of electric shock treatments in counseling. This type of claim is also 
distinguishable from clergy malpractice. 
c. Religious fraud claims. A private plaintiff may allege a civil 
fraud claim against clergy, or a government entity may levy criminal 
charges against clergy for religious fraud. For example, in United 
States v. Ballard,21 Guy and Edna Ballard and their son were accused 
and convicted of mail fraud. The Ballards claimed to have supernatural 
healing powers for people afflicted with serious diseases and used the 
United States mails to convey these representations and to solicit and 
collect funds. However, the Court held that a person can never be tried 
for holding certain religious tenets, nor can an individual be required to 
prove in a court of law the objective truth of those same tenets.22 This 
type of claim is also distinguishable from clergy malpractice. 
d. Alleged "mind control" claims. Finally, as Professor Esbeck 
explains, "mind control" claims are typically brought by a former 
member of a religious group.23 Successful claims of this type usually 
arise in one of three instances: ( 1) when there has been force or threat 
of force, (2) intentional outrageous conduct, or (3) fraud as to purely 
secular representations. 24 Moreover, these suits are often combined 
with claims discussed in other categories like fraud, emotional distress, 
or invasion of privacy. Although the specific elements of clergy mal-
practice are not easily defined, Professor Esbeck distinguishes these 
four categories of claims from clergy malpractice. This distinction is 
helpful because it narrows the focus to better identify a distinctive claim 
of clergy malpractice. 
19. See Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975). In Bear, 
the court held that shunning, a type of discipline practiced by some Anabaptists, may be an exces-
sive interference with matters of compelling state interest, such as maintenance of marital and 
family relationships. 
20. 446 So. 2d 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
21. 322 U.S. 78 (1944), rev'd 329 U.S. 187 (1946). In Ballard, the Court established the 
limits of the permissible regulation and punishment .of religious fraud. 
22. /d. at 88. 
23. Esbeck, supra note 10, at 110. 
24. /d. 
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2. Tort claims arising from the context of pastoral counseling and 
spiritual guidance 
Courts and commentators seem to agree that clergy malpractice 
claims arise from situations involving pastoral counseling or spiritual 
guidance. 211 Pastoral counseling situations, however, have also given rise 
to claims against religious leaders and organizations that are distin-
guishable from clergy malpractice. For example, clergy have faced suits 
for seduction and child molestation arising in the counseling setting. 26 
These actions are often brought by adults who have sought guidance 
from clergy or on behalf of children who have been placed in the 
clergy's care. 
When an adult counselee is seduced by, or even willingly consents 
to sexual relations with a member of the clergy, interested third parties, 
usually the counselee's spouse, may bring a claim of alienation of affec-
tions.27 This claim, however, has either been abolished or fallen into 
disuse in most jurisdictions. 28 
In the context of clergy counseling or spiritual guidance, clergy are 
also arguably liable for breaches of confidential communications. Most 
jurisdictions in the United States, either by common law or by statute, 
provide an evidentiary clergy /counselee privilege that protects commu-
nications between those parties made in the professional context of spir-
itual advisement.29 Perhaps this privilege should be extended to also 
impose a general duty not to disclose confidential communications re-
ceived in the context of spiritual advisement. The likelihood that such 
an argument will succeed, however, is questionable. 
The case of Hester v. Barnett30 demonstrates the difficulties that a 
plaintiff faces in prevailing on this theory. There, the Hesters, a mar-
ried couple, sued a Baptist minister for "ministerial malpractice," 
25. See, e.g., Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987) (per curiam) (Maddox, J., 
concurring specially) (the validity of clergy malpractice is most typically articulated in terms of the 
pastoral counseling function). Apparently, no commentators have suggested an action for clergy 
malpractice in a context other than clergy counseling. 
26. Esbeck, supra note 10, at 87 (citing Lund v. Caple, tOO Wash. 2d 739, 675 P.2d 226 
( 1984) (husband's suit against church and pastor alleging pastor had sexual relations with his wife 
during counseling); Anderson v. Puhl, No. 159581 (D. Minn. 1983), reported in NAT'L. L.J., 
May 16, 1983, at 3 (suit against Roman Catholic Diocese for tortious injury resulting from 
priest's homosexual acts with minor)). 
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 683 (1977) reads: "One who purposely alienates 
one's spouse's affections from the other spouse is subject to liability for the harm thus caused to 
any of the other spouse's legally protected marital interests." 
28. See PRoSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 124, at 929-31; see also, e.g., O'Neil v. 
Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 475-76, 733 P.2d 693, 696-98 (1986) (cause of action for alienation of 
affections abolished in Idaho). 
29. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060 (1987). 
30. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
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among other claims. The Hesters had gone to the pastor for counseling, 
who allegedly promised not to divulge anything that the Hesters told 
him. Despite this, the pastor informed the church community that the 
Hesters had abused their children. 
The court examined the Hesters' claim under Missouri's clergy/ 
counselee privilege which "renders a clergyman incompetent to testify 
concerning a communication made to him in the professional character 
as spiritual advisor .... " 31 The court rejected the Hesters' claim be-
cause the statute's requirement of confidentiality applied only to testi-
mony in judicial proceedings and did not imply any legal duty on confi-
dentiality outside the courtroom. 32 
In sum, a variety of tort claims may be made against clergy for 
alleged offenses committed in the counseling context. However, clergy 
malpractice should not be confused with other claims arising from 
counseling, such as child molestation, alienation of affections, or breach 
of confidential communications. 
B. Clergy Malpractice as a Distinct Tort 
How, then, does one define clergy malpractice? What makes mal-
practice in general different from other torts? Two aspects of clergy 
malpractice make it different from other tort claims which may be 
brought against laypersons, and a third aspect, arguably, makes it dif-
ferent from malpractice claims which may be brought against other 
professionals. 
First, as noted earlier,33 malpractice is a form of negligence and 
not an intentional tort. Intentional torts, such as fraud, focus on the 
defendant's state of mind (i.e., whether a defendant intended to do an 
act which caused harm or damage). 34 The focus of negligence, however, 
is whether the defendant's conduct was extraordinarily careless (i.e., 
whether the defendant's actions presented an unreasonable risk upon 
others to the extent that the defendant should have known to act more 
carefully in order to avoid injuring the plaintiff).36 Therefore, a mal-
practice action is simply a negligence claim alleging that a defendant 
did not act with sufficient care and should, therefore, pay for injuries 
resulting from his or her negligence. Claims against a cleric arising 
from counsel given to a counselee ordinarily do not allege the cleric was 
intentionally giving bad counsel. Rather, plaintiffs usually allege negli-
31. Id. at 554 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060 (1987)). 
32. Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 554. 
33. See supra note II and accompanying text. 
34. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 38, at 34. 
35. Id., § 31, at 169. 
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gence on the part of the cleric. Clergy malpractice, therefore, is not an 
intentional tort. 
Second, malpractice is a specialized form of negligence defined as 
the "[f]ailure of one rendering professional services to exercise that de-
gree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circum-
stances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of 
the profession .... "38 Professionals, therefore, when acting as profes-
sionals, are held to a higher standard of care than a layperson in a 
similar situation. For instance, a medical doctor who gives medical ad-
vice to a patient must adhere to the standards of the medical profession. 
A layperson who gives medical advice to another, however, may only be 
held to a standard of negligence required of other laypersons. 
Each specific profession or trade has a unique set of standards that 
constitute the standard of care in a malpractice action. There are, how-
ever, certain common law elements inherent in all malpractice actions. 
These are: 
(1) One must be part of a profession or trade. 
(2) The professional must have a duty to those who he or she 
serves. 
(3) The professional must breach that duty by acting or practic-
ing at a level of competence (or standard of care) below that 
which is normally possessed by members of that profession 
or trade.37 
These elements separate malpractice actions from negligence actions 
against nonprofessionals. If the clergy is viewed as a profession, a cleric 
might also be held to the standard of care "normally possessed" by 
other members of the clergy. 
Third, clergy malpractice is arguably a unique type of malpractice 
claim, simply because it applies the elements of malpractice to the pro-
fession of the clergy. Actions against medical doctors, lawyers, and ac-
countants for professional malpractice are recognized as medical, legal, 
and accounting malpractice, respectively. Likewise, other professionals 
may also be held to the standard of care associated with their profes-
sion.38 The clergy, it may be argued, is similarly a distinct profession, 
having its own set of "professional standards," for which an action for 
clergy malpractice should be recognized. As noted earlier, clergy mal-
practice claims usually arise in the context of pastoral counseling or 
36. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 864 (5th ed. 1979). 
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 299A (1965). The Restatement acknowledges 
that the level of skill and knowledge the law requires will vary if there are differing "schools of 
thought" within the particular profession. Id. at comment f. 
38. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 185-86. 
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spiritual guidance. 38 
Applying these elements to the clergy has proven highly controver-
sial. First, although courts generally recognize clergy as part of a pro-
fession, some courts may not consider clergy "professionals" in terms of 
their legal liability for counseling activities.40 Moreover, the second and 
third elements, the existence of a legal duty and the maintenance of a 
certain standard of care, are even more difficult for courts to apply to 
the clergy because of the extreme difficulty in fashioning a standard of 
care which clergy must follow.41 An examination of positions in favor 
of and against a recognized claim of clergy malpractice highlight the 
difficulties of applying the elements of a malpractice claim to the 
clergy. 
Ill. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ACKNOWLEDGING 
A CLERGY MALPRACTICE ACTION 
A. Arguments Favoring the Creation of a Cause of Action for Clergy 
Malpractice Actions 
A leading advocate for the creation of a clergy malpractice action 
is Edward Barker, a Los Angeles attorney who represented the plain-
tiffs in the leading case of Nally v. Grace Community Church of the 
Valley.'12 The Nally case provides rigorous and lucid arguments favor-
ing the creation of a clergy malpractice claim. Because Nally is such a 
rich source for understanding the implications of allowing such a claim, 
it is helpful to explore the facts of that case. 
On April 1, 1979, twenty-four-year-old Kenneth Nally committed 
suicide by shooting himself in the head with a shotgun. That same 
year, Kenneth's parents, Walter and Maria Nally, sued Grace Com-
munity Church of the Valley in a wrongful death action alleging that 
39. See supra note 25. One may wonder if the clergy could be liable for malpractice for 
advice given to a congregation in a sermon. The problem with allowing malpractice claims for 
statements made from the pulpit would be that the requisite fiduciary relationship, which exists in 
the counseling context, would not be as clear when advice is given over the pulpit. There, the 
cleric is most likely not aware of the particular problems or emotional state of each member of his 
or her audience. Moreover, a cleric speaking to an audience cannot know how each member of his 
or her listening audience will respond to the sermon. Some may take his or her exhortations very 
seriously, while others may ignore them. 
40. See Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 299-300, 763 P.2d at 960-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (distin-
guishing clergy as nontherapist counselors who are subject to different standards of care than 
professional counselors like psychiatrists and psychologists). Even if pastors could be deemed "pro-
fessionals," a question exists whether lay pastors should be held to the same standard as full-time 
pastors. 
41. See Comment, supra note 13, at 148-54. 
42. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 
(1989). 
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their son's suicide was the result of incompetent counseling by church 
officials. In particular, the parents alleged that once the pastor and 
church staff counselors were aware that Kenneth was suicidal, they had 
a duty to refer him to professional therapists who were competent to 
handle suicidal counselees. The theory on which the Nallys based their 
suit was "clergy malpractice."43 
The California Supreme Court dismissed the suit holding that 
pastoral, nontherapist counselors had no duty to refer potentially sui-
cidal persons to professional therapists and thus could not be held liable 
for negligence following a suicide.44 The court also noted, however, that 
its opinion did not foreclose imposing liability on nontherapist counsel-
ors who hold themselves out as professionals for injuries related to their 
counseling activities. 411 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kaufman made reference to the 
majority's note that nontherapist counselors who hold themselves out as 
professionals may be liable for injuries resulting from their counseling 
activities and argued that under that rule, the evidence indicated that 
Grace Community Church officials did owe a duty of care to th~ de-
ceased.'6 The evidence upon which Justice Kaufman would have found 
a duty is that Grace Church officials had represented that they were 
equipped to deal with suicidal counselees, had developed a close coun-
seling relationship with the decedent, and had realized that suicide was 
at least a possibility.'7 Justice Kaufman, however, concurred with the 
result reached by the majority, finding that the defendants had fulfilled 
that duty in the circumstances.46 
The Nally case has spurred voluminous discussion, often with 
sharp disagreement, over the propriety of suits for clergy malpractice. 
Arguing for the creation of a clergy malpractice tort, Edward Barker, 
43. /d. at 287, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102. 
44. /d. at 299-300, 763 P.2d at 960-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110. Procedurally, the trial court 
granted summary judgment for defendants on the basis that plaintiffs had failed to raise a triable 
issue of fact. The court of appeal reversed the grant of summary judgement, focusing on the 
wrongful death claim based on intentional infliction of emotional distress while ignoring the clergy 
malpractice claim. The California Supreme Court reversed, de-published the court of appeal's 
opinion, and remanded the case for trial. At trial, the trial court granted defendants' motion for a 
nonsuit, and plaintiffs appealed. The court of appeal again reversed, and the supreme court 
granted certiorari. The supreme court reversed, affirming the trial court's granting of a nonsuit 
and dismissing the case. !d. at 291, 763 P.2d at 955, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 104. 
45. /d. at 300 n.8, 763 P.2d at 961 n.8, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 n.8. 
46. /d. at 305, 763 P.2d at 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (Kaufman, J., concurring). 
47. /d. 
48. !d. at 313-14,763 P.2d at 970, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 119 (Kaufman, J., concurring). Justice 
Kaufman noted that "defendants were not only aware that Nally was under the care of medical 
doctors, including a psychiatrist, but affirmatively advised him on several occasions to seek medical 
care." /d. 
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attorney for the N allys, places great emphasis on the need to regulate 
and supervise clergy just like all other professionals. 0 Barker asserts 
that such a cause of action is needed because, even though clerics are 
unregulated by their peers as are other professionals, "their close emo-
tional relationships with parishioners give them a unique opportunity 
to. affect lives. " 110 
The majority in Nally indicated some support for the policy argu-
ments made by Barker in recognizing that clergy should not enjoy abso-
lute immunity in all situations, noting that a nontherapist counselor 
holding him or herself out as a professional therapist, that is, a licensed 
counselor, may be held to the same high standard of care as a profes-
sional therapist. 111 While the court in Nally did not specifically state 
whether this comment applied to clergy, the court did refer to clergy as 
"non therapist counselors. " 112 
In support of Barker's argument that clerics should be restrained 
because many seek and obtain the public's trust and confidence in 
counseling, statistics demonstrate that people turn to the clergy first in 
times of emotional stress. 113 One author suggests that this is because 
turning to the clergy affords unique benefits from the rest of the mental 
health community and can aid in dispelling fears a counselee or his or 
her family may have of psychiatry.114 For example, a cleric often knows 
the counselee personally. Further, there is no social stigma attached to 
approaching a cleric with personal problems, as there may be with a 
mental health professional. Home visitations by the clergy are also 
common. Finally, most clergy do not charge for their counseling ser-
vices. Thus, they are in a unique position to successfully entice the 
public into intimate counseling relationships. In light of this, it is ar-
guably sensible that a member of the clergy should be civilly liable for 
damages for an injury occurring when (1) a cleric represents him or 
herself to have certain counseling abilities, (2) a member of the public 
49. Barker, supra note 7, at 56. 
50. ld. Barker cites the incident at Jonestown, Guyana, to illustrate his point. The Jones-
town, incident involved a sectarian California church leader, Jim Jones, who led more than 900 
followers to a South American jungle, promising to build a utopian community. Once in South 
America, the leaders of the church community became increasingly totalitarian in their control and 
harsh in their discipline of followers. Eventually, church leader Jones organized and ordered a 
mass genocide of the entire community. Members of the community either voluntarily or forcefully 
drank Kool-aid mixed with poison. Over 900 died in the incident. 
51. 47 Cal. 3d at 300 n.8, 763 P.2d at 961 n.8, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 n.8. 
52. /d. at 299-300, 763 P.2d at 960-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110. 
53. See Note, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in Dis-
guise? 17 ToLEDO L. REV. 209, 219-21 (1985); see also Griffith & Young, Pastoral Counseling 
and the Concept of Malpractice, 15 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY L. 257 (1987). 
54. See Note, supra note 53, at 221. 
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enters into a fiduciary counseling relationship relying on that represen-
tation, and (3) the cleric deals irresponsibly with that person so as to 
seriously injure him or her in that counseling context. 
The benefits of imposing such liability could arguably be great. 
Clergy malpractice liability could raise the level of minimum compe-
tence of clergy counseling. It could also give the public greater confi-
dence in the ability of clergy to deal with serious emotional or psycho-
logical distress. Finally, imposing clergy malpractice liability could 
clarify to the clergy what their duties to the public are in counseling 
situations. 
Although the court in Nally found that clergy liability was neither 
legally nor factually warranted in that case, the acts or omissions of 
some clergy in the future may be truly outrageous and may warrant 
liability. It is hard to imagine that clergy will enjoy absolute tort im-
munity no matter how egregious their negligent acts are. The creation 
of a clergy malpractice tort targeted to deter negligent clergy from be-
having below acceptable standards of care to the detriment of their pa-
rishioner-counselees is, arguably, prudent and sound policy. 
B. Arguments Against the Creation of a Cause of Action for Clergy 
Malpractice 
The California Supreme Court's holding in Nally illuminates 
some of the arguments against clergy malpractice actions. Although the 
court left open the possibility of nontherapist liability in certain in-
stances, the court declined to designate any actionable claim against 
clergy as "clergy malpractice."1111 The court articulated three reasons, 
reviewed below, for not imposing a duty upon clergy. 
First, the supreme court in Nally was unwilling to impose a duty 
on nontherapist counselors to prevent suicides or to refer suicidal coun-
selees to medical or psychiatric health personnel.116 In support of this, 
the court noted that the legislature exempted clergy from licensing re-
quirements.117 This exemption, the court stated, revealed the legisla-
ture's desire that the clergy should be free from state-imposed counsel-
ing standards.118 
Second, the supreme court reasoned that even if a duty were im-
posed, a standard of care to which clergy should be held would be 
nearly impossible to fashion because of the large variety of theological 
55. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 299-300, 763 P.2d at 960-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110. 
56. /d. at 297, 763 P.2d at 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108. 
57. /d. at 298, 763 P.2d at 959-60, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109. 
58. /d. 
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positions espoused by clergy in the state of California!19 It may also be 
noted that the plurality of views in religious counseling is evidenced by 
the variations of counseling training that clergy receive. While some 
clergy obtain little or no formal counseling courses in their preparation 
for ministry, others may base the majority of their ministerial schooling 
on pastoral or spiritual counseling. 
In Nally, plaintiffs' attorney Barker tried to overcome the problem 
of a unified standard of care in clergy counseling by introducing expert 
testimony from a group of diverse protestant ministers from different 
denominations.60 At trial, Barker's experts testified that all competent 
clergy should be held to at least three common standards of care61 in 
counseling situations. Such testimony failed, however, to avoid a grant 
of nonsuit by the trial court. 62 
Third, the Nally court stated that because of "differing theological 
views espoused by the myriad of religions," imposing a duty of care 
would "quite possibly [be] unconstitutional," because "[s]uch a duty 
would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the 
particular denomination . . . . "63 While the court did not elaborate on 
the theoretical details of this issue, it has been a major concern of many 
who oppose clergy malpractice suits. 64 The basic argument is that hold-
ing clergy liable for their conduct in the context of spiritual counseling 
will interfere with their right to exercise religion freely-a right guar-
anteed by the first amendment.66 It may be argued that imposing po-
tential liability upon clergy counselors would burden the clergy's free 
exercise rights in several ways. First, clergy would be forced to defend 
their religious practices before secular courts. Moreover, the authority 
of their religion would be undermined because it is called into question 
by the courts. Finally, the looming threat of a possible lawsuit brought 
by a counselee might chill the relationship between the cleric and his or 
her counselees. 
In addition to constitutional difficulties, practically it may be too 
difficult for a court to determine the point at which a counselor /coun-
59. /d. at 299, 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109. 
60. Barker, supra note 7, at 58. See also Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 289 n.4, 763 P.2d at 953 n.4, 
253 Cal. Rptr. at 103 n.4 (noting that the trial court refused to hear testimony of a witness from 
the American Pastoral Counseling Association who was to attest to a standard of care applicable 
to all clergy). 
61. See infra text accompanying note 93 (three common standards set forth). 
62. See supra note 44. 
63. 47 Cal. 3d at 299, 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109. 
64. See Esbeck, supra note 10, at 2-114; Comment, supra note 8, at 232-39. 
65. U.S. CaNST. amend. I. The establishment and free exercise clauses together read: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof .... " ld. 
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selee relationship arises.88 It is unfair to hold clergy liable for counsel-
ing-related activities when it is not clear to both parties whether a 
counseling relationship even exists.S7 Spiritual counseling occurs in a 
variety of settings ranging from informal conversations over the tele-
phone or in classrooms to formal sessions in the confessional or the 
privacy of a clergy's office. Professor Esbeck notes that clergy typically 
have no pecuniary interest in the counseling relationship; thus they are 
distinct from other professionals.88 
Finally, the disdain which many religions have for psychiatry and 
psychology may make it impracticable to impose malpractice liability 
upon clergy.89 Some clergy may believe that secular psychology is not 
an appropriate solution for a spiritual problem. This argument again 
raises the problem of how to craft a unified standard of care between a 
cleric who ignores modern psychology in his or her counseling practices 
and one who holds that spiritual healing is best facilitated through, and 
is incidental to, psychological therapy. 7° Further, this problem also may 
require courts to scrutinize protected areas of the clergy's religious 
belief.71 
The arguments disfavoring the allowance of clergy malpractice 
suits are compelling and so far have prevailed in the courts. However, 
the Nally case suggests that, given the right circumstances, a cause of 
action for clergy malpractice may be just around the corner. The likeli-
hood of a successful clergy malpractice claim in the future, and how a 
court upholding such a claim might address the arguments articulated 
above, is the subject of the next section. 
66. See Esbeck, supra note I 0, at 83. 
67. See Comment, supra note 13, at 157-58. This commentator suggests that a two-fold test, 
with an objective and a subjective prong, will reveal if a counseling relationship exists. Under the 
objective prong, courts can determine whether a member of the clergy is engaged in counseling if 
observable activities are consistent with a secular counterpart. Under the subjective prong, the 
court would determine if each party perceived that a counseling relationship existed. /d. 
68. See Esbeck, supra note I 0, at 83. 
69. See id. at 84. 
70. See Griffith & Young, supra note 53, at 257-65. Griffith and Young argue that the 
difficulty in defining pastoral counseling will be a major stumbling block in developing a standard 
of care for clergy malpractice claims. It may also be argued that the extent to which pastoral 
counseling is religious versus psychological is indeterminable. 
71. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (establishing that the Consti-
tution's religion clauses allow absolute protection of freedom to believe, but limited protection of 
freedom to act, the latter being subject to protection of society). One might argue, based on 
Cantwell, that clergy counselors may not act outrageously so as to injure a counselee, even if their 
acts are religiously motivated. A problem in clergy negligence cases, however, is that a cleric's 
failure to act may also cause injury. A more difficult question is whether a nontherapist counselor 
who fails to do something because of religious reasons is protected by the free exercise clause. 
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IV. THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESSFUL CLERGY MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS 
A tally of the arguments in the preceding section on the pros and 
cons of creating a clergy malpractice tort shows that a greater number 
of arguments disfavor the tort. However, that does not necessarily mean 
that the possibility of a successful clergy malpractice claim is foreclosed. 
First, courts have demonstrated that they are not afraid to hold 
clergy or their churches liable for torts if a legal wrong has been com-
mitted.72 The first amendment does not create blanket immunity for 
everything clergy do, irrespective of the injury or negligence involved. 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Ballard73 
that the courts may not challenge the accuracy of one's sincere religious 
beliefs.74 However, it is certainly conceivable that clergy could act neg-
ligently in a counseling situation, "at least where their religious beliefs 
are not challenged," precisely the argument posited in Nally. 711 
Second, some courts have shown a greater willingness to hold 
nontherapist counselors in general to a higher standard of care than the 
public at large. For example, the California Court of Appeal in Rich-
ard H. v. Larry D. 76 ruled that a marriage counselor may be liable for 
"negligent infliction of emotional distress" for having sexual relations 
with a patient's spouse while the couple was receiving marital counsel-
ing.77 The court rejected defendant's argument that the complaint was 
barred by a California statute which states that "no cause of action 
arises for ... (s]eduction of a person over the age of legal consent."78 
The court concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that a person 
seeking a counselor's help in order to stabilize and improve a marriage 
would feel betrayed and suffer emotional distress upon learning that 
the counselor, during the treatment, had been engaging in sexual rela-
tions with his or her spouse.79 
While Richard H. appears similar to claims against clergy for 
alienation of spousal affections, mentioned earlier, there are two impor-
72. See Note, supra note 9, at 1303 n.21 (citing Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co., 370 So. 2d 511, 514 
(La. 1979) (church liable for pastor's negligence when pastor created unreasonable risk of injury 
by not clearing aisles of praying parishioners to make way for the "running or moving 'in the 
Spirit' [which] were common forms of religious expression at that church"); Sch~en v. Kerner, 544 
S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (charitable immunity defense unavailable to individual priests 
who failed to warn or to abate dangerous condition in rectory)). 
73. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
74. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
75. See Barker, supra note 7, at 59. 
76. 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1988). 
77. /d. at 596-97, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
78. /d. at 594, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (quoting CAL. C1v. CoDE § 43.5 (West 1982)). 
79. ld. at 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
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tant differences. First, alienation of spousal affections is an intentional 
tort. The claim in Richard H. was for alleged negligence on the coun-
selor's part. Negligence standards, which are the basis of malpractice 
claims, do not merely prohibit improper behavior but demand proper 
behavior. Professional standards hold a professional to an affirmative 
duty to conform to a certain level of professionalism. Although the tort 
of alienation of affections had been abolished in California, the Rich-
ard H. case illustrates that similar conduct, when committed by a pro-
fessionals engaged in their profession, gives rise to a separate claim for 
professional malpractice. The abolishing statute, which ordinarily pro-
vides a defense for those who seduce another over the age of legal con-
sent, does not extend to counselors in a marriage counseling context. 
Second, as noted above, alienation of spousal affections is recog-
nized only in a dying minority of jurisdictions.80 The court in Nally 
designated clergy as nontherapist counselors.81 Thus, presumably, 
clergy in California may be held to the same higher standard of care 
toward marriage counselees as the marriage counselor in Richard H. 
A third factor, indicating that some plaintiffs may eventually suc-
ceed in clergy malpractice actions, is illustrated by the California Court 
of Appeal's holding in its second consideration of the Nally case. As 
characterized by the supreme court, the court of appeal held the follow-
ing in a two-to-one decision: 
The Court of Appeals again reversed, holding that although the 
"clergyman malpractice" count failed to state a cause of action sepa-
rate from the "negligence" count, both could be construed as stating a 
cause of action for the "negligent failure to prevent suicide" by 
"nontherapist counselors." In this context, the Court of Appeals held 
that nontherapist counselors-both religious and secular-have a 
duty to refer suicidal persons to psychiatrists or psychologists quali-
fied to prevent suicides. 82 
The supreme court also noted that the court of appeal held that the 
imposition of a negligence standard of care on pastoral counselors does 
not violate the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first amend-
ment.83 The court of appeal reasoned that there is a compelling state 
interest in the preservation of life that justifies the "narrowly tailored 
burden on religious expression imposed by such tort liability."8" 
80. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
82. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 290, 763 P.2d 948, 
954, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
83. /d. at 290, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 104. 
84. /d. 
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The court of appeal's decision reveals the willingness of some 
judges to hold the clergy to the standard of other nontherapist counsel-
ors. While the court of appeal did not label the alleged tort "clergy 
malpractice," its decision recognized a tort in the context of clergy 
counseling. Had the court of appeal's decision stood, it would have been 
a case where a member of the clergy was liable for negligent acts done 
or omitted in the course of that profession. Arguably, this amounts to 
"clergy malpractice." 
Finally, as alluded to earlier, the California Supreme Court ex-
plicitly left open the possibility of liability for nontherapist counselors 
who hold themselves out as professionals and who negligently cause 
injuries in the course of their counseling activities.u In future cases, 
then, liability may hinge on whether a nontherapist cleric held him or 
herself out as competent to counsel certain kinds of emotional problems. 
Practically, a judge or jury would have difficulty distinguishing a 
nontherapist cleric who held him or herself out as a professional (i.e., a 
licensed counselor) from any other professional counselor. As noted 
above, in his concurrence in Nally, Justice Kaufman recognized a duty 
on the part of defendant pastors to refer Kenneth Nally to competent 
medical and psychiatric authorities.86 Future judges may use a similar 
analysis to determine that a cleric represented him or herself as a pro-
fessional counselor. Thus, Justice Kaufman's view of how Grace 
Church leaders held themselves out as competent to deal with suicidal 
counselees merits an extensive quotation. Justice Kaufman noted that 
the record in Nally revealed: 
The Grace Community Church (Church), at the time of the events in 
question, employed about 50 pastoral counselors . . . . Pastoral coun-
seling, as described in the church's 1979 annual report, constituted "a 
very important part of the ministry at Grace Church." Church coun-
selors offered their services not only to congregants, but to large num-
bers of nonmembers as well. In 1979, the annual report noted, about 
50 percent of those seeking counseling came from outside the church. 
Furthermore, while much of the counseling was an ad hoc or "drop-
in" nature, more formal counseling was offered as well, with regu-
larly scheduled counseling "sessions" much like those between a ther-
apist and a patient .... [A] number of church pastors taught clas-
ses, published books and sold tape recordings on the subject of biblical 
counseling. 
. . . Several of the counselors testified that they considered them-
selves fully competent to treat a whole range of mental illnesses, in-
85. See supra note 5 I and accompanying text. 
86. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
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eluding depression and schizophrenia ... , [and] claimed to possess 
not only competence, but broad experience in the counseling of per-
sons with recurrent suicidal or even homicidal tendencies . 
. . . [A] church publication entitled, "Guide for Biblical Coun-
selors" (Guide) [asserted that] ... absent a gross psychological cause 
such as a brain tumor, "every emotional problem" was within the 
competence of the pastoral counselor to handle. Among the symptoms 
or disorders the Guide listed as falling within the pastoral counselor's 
domain were "drug abuse, alcoholism, phobias, deep depression, sui-
cide, mania, nervous breakdowns, manic-depressive [disorder] and 
schizophrenia. "87 
This passage illuminates how some courts might interpret the ma-
jority's phrase, "nontherapist counselors who hold themselves out as 
professionals," as one holding him or herself out as competent to handle 
suicidal counselees.88 If Justice Kaufman could find a duty in Nally, it 
is conceivable that other reasonable courts and juries could also find 
that clergy who engage in the above quoted activities would be holding 
themselves out as competent to deal with suicidal counselees. A cleric 
holding him or herself out in such a manner who does not act as 
responsibly as the defendants in Nally and who injures a counselee, 
might be found liable for clergy malpractice damages. Although it may 
be incidental that a nontherapist counselor is also a member of the 
clergy, that cleric would nonetheless be liable for negligent acts done in 
the context of his or her profession. 
V. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
The protest by clergy, church officials, and related organizations 
against allowing clergy malpractice claims has been overwhelming. In 
Nally, amicus briefs from churches, synagogues, and religious groups 
around the nation were filed in support of defendants. 89 One amicus 
petition included 6,669 churches and related organizations.90 In addi-
tion to acting as attorney for defendants in Nally, former United States 
Solicitor General and present President of Brigham Young University, 
Rex Lee, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, arguing that if upheld, clergy malpractice claims 
would "discourage many of the church's bishops and other ecclesiastical 
leaders from counseling emotionally troubled members about their spir-
87. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 305-06, 763 P.2d at 964-65, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15 (citations 
omitted) (Kaufman, J., concurring). 
88. ld. at 300 n.8, 763 P.2d at 961 n.8, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 n.8. 
89. Blodget, Religion Liable for Counseling? 74 A.B.A. J., Aug. I, 1986, at 30. 
90. Id. 
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itual and other problems."91 
Despite protest by religious leaders, however, clergy malpractice 
claims will probably not simply disappear. Thus, at present, prevention 
appears to be the best remedy. In order for clergy to determine what 
measures would best immunize them from liability, they should con-
sider the concepts discussed earlier, which comprise a cause of action 
for malpractice of any kind: (1) the existence of a professional relation-
ship which imposes a fiduciary duty of care upon the professional to-
wards the client (parishioner-counselee), (2) identifiable standards to 
which the professional should be held, and (3) injury resulting from 
breach of the duty of care. 92 Also, clergy should consider how existing 
cases-particularly Nally-dealt with those tort concepts. 
As for the duty element, clergy would best protect themselves from 
liability by presuming the existence of a professional and legal duty to 
counselees. While case law and commentators may continue to argue 
that no such duty should exist, a presumption that a duty does exist 
will keep the clergy alerted to maintain high professional standards in 
all counseling situations. 
The second element of malpractice noted above indicates that 
clergy should define what constitutes "responsible" conduct in their 
counseling activities and abide by that level of responsibility. Con-
sciously determining what behavior is most appropriate as a cleric will 
improve the quality of one's counseling and will simultaneously help 
reduce the risk of legal liability. Where should clergy turn to determine 
what might be considered "responsible" conduct for a counselor? As 
noted earlier, in Nally, before the trial judge dismissed the case, plain-
tiffs' attorney offered expert testimony which he argued established 
identifiable standards of care for clergy in the counseling context. 93 
Three ministers, who also practiced psychiatry or psychology and were 
from both liberal and conservative denominations, testified that the fol-
lowing standards were interdenominationally used among responsible 
clergy. Those standards are: 
(1) Investigation-the cleric investigates whether the counselee 
is serious about suicide (or another conduct for which the 
clergy may be held liable). 
(2) Referral-if no psychologist or psychiatrist is connected with 
the counseling and if warranted based on the investigation, 
an appropriate referral should be made. 
91. /d. (quoting Amicus Brief for Respondents, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the 
Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988)). 
92. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
93. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
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(3) Consultation-vital information should be shared with pro-
fessionals and nonprofessionals who are in a position to 
help.94 
Despite the ultimate dismissal of the Nallys' claim, the expert tes-
timony they offered is instructive for clergy because it suggests some 
tangible and sensible directives which clergy can apply to their counsel-
ing ministries and which may help to insulate them from legal liability. 
Thus, it seems likely that, at least in California, courts would not find 
clergy liable if they follow the recommendations of plaintiffs' experts in 
Nally. Clergy who frequently counsel parishioners should develop a 
network of responsible professionals in related counseling fields with 
whom they can consult and to whom they can refer counselees. That 
network may include psychiatrists, psychologists, marital and family 
counselors, and fellow clergy. 
Clergy should also consider that the California Supreme Court in 
Nally suggested that clergy who "hold themselves out as professionals" 
may be held to the same high standards of care to which professional 
counselors (i.e., licensed therapists) are held. 911 Thus, in order to avoid 
legal liability, a cleric should begin a counseling relationship by clearly 
defining what he or she is equipped to handle as a counselor. The 
cleric should state his or her limits and inform the counselee that if the 
counselee's problem is beyond his or her abilities as a cleric, then he or 
she may refer the counselee to a colleague who knows more about the 
counselee's problem. One commentator suggests that this boundary-
setting may even take the form of a disclaimer posted outside a church 
counseling office. 96 
It may be argued that a cleric's referral of a counselee to other 
professionals will cause the counselee to lose confidence in the cleric. 
However, that criticism seems misguided. A sick patient who ap-
proaches his or her medical doctor does not lose confidence in the doc-
tor when he or she refers the patient to a specialist who is better 
equipped to deal with the patient's specific medical problem. Similarly, 
if a parishioner trustingly approaches clergy for counseling, the parish-
ioner will not likely lose confidence in the cleric who suggests that the 
counselee may be directed to a counselor more skilled to handle the 
parishioner's problem. Indee.d, a parishioner-counselee may even have 
greater confidence in a cleric who investigates, refers, and consults be-
94. See Barker, supra note 7, at 58. Because the California Supreme Court found no duty 
existed, the issue of whether plaintiffs' established a valid standard of care for clergy was not 
addressed. 
95. See Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 300 n.B, 763 P.2d at 961 n.B, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 n.B. 
96. See Comment, supra note 13, at 137. 
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cause the counselee realizes that the cleric is in contact with a larger 
network of mental and physical health workers in the community, all of 
whom are there to help the counselee. 
Some clergy may have the training and experience to handle seri-
ous emotional problems of members of the community and they may 
choose to represent themselves in that manner. Those clergy should be 
prepared to confront the potential liability of their professional counter-
parts such as psychiatrists or psychologists. 
Those interested in limiting the tort liability of clergy might also 
consider writing to state legislators to encourage them to draft legisla-
tion immunizing clergy from malpractice liability. The Nally case may 
be relied upon in arguing that, for legal purposes, clergy should be 
considered nontherapist counselors (i.e., non-licensed) who should not 
be legally bound by state-imposed duties to refer counselees to medical 
or psychiatric doctors. Finally, if clergy want to reduce the risk of being 
held personally liable for their counseling actions, they should purchase 
"clergy malpractice insurance." Courts and commentators have indi-
cated that this insurance is available.97 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
Since ancient times religious communities have prescribed limits 
on the behavior of their religious leaders. In ancient Israel, for exam-
ple, the religious community executed false prophets whose prophecies 
did not come true.98 Levitical priests were to receive no inheritance 
from other Israelites,99 although they were entitled to support by re-
ceiving portions of each sacrifice given by worshippers. 100 In ancient 
Christianity, one of the Pauline letters, I Timothy, delineates the re-
quirements of a bishop, stating: 
If anyone aspires to the office of bishop . . . [he] must be above re-
proach, the husband of one wife, temperate, sensible, dignified, hospi-
table, an apt teacher, no drunkard, not violent but gentle, not quarrel-
some, and no lover of money. He must manage his own household 
well, keeping his children submissive ... [,] [and] he must be well 
thought of by outsiders.101 
97. See Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 299, 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (citing Note, 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free Enterprise"r, 84 
MICH. L. REV. at 1296, 1300 n.12 (1986)). 
98. Deuteronomy 13:1-5. 
99. Deuteronomy 18:1-6. 
100. Leviticus 2:2-3. 
101. I Timothy 3:1-7 (Rev. Stand.). The I Timothy text also discusses the qualifications for 
other church leaders such as deacons (I Timothy 3:8-13) and elders (I Timothy 5:17 -22). 
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Contemporary clergy malpractice actions also attempt to regulate 
clergy behavior or at least to limit the extent to which clergy may act 
freely when they counsel parishioners. The difference between modern 
clergy malpractice actions and the Jewish and Christian regulations 
mentioned is the source of regulation. Directives for clergy behavior 
from within a religious community is, to Americans, probably more 
palatable than directives for religious leaders prescribed by a state judi-
ciary or legislature. Unpalatable as state directives may be, the behav-
ior of prominent, trusted ministers in the 1980s has demonstrated that 
some acts by clergy may be so shocking that society will articulate legal 
limitations for the clergy in certain circumstances. 
Odds are that future careless acts by some clergy somewhere will 
force the courts and society to determine what the limits and duties of 
the clergy are in the clergy counseling context. For example, will we 
consider it permissible for clergy to discourage parishioner-counselees 
from taking medication which stabilizes their mental and emotional 
states, if the sole basis for the clergy's advice is an unwarranted self-
confidence in his or her ability to counsel? What if the counselee stops 
taking the medication and kills him or herself? What if the clergy knew 
of the likelihood that the counselee would commit suicide without the 
medication? What if the clergy did not consult anyone else about the 
counselee's problem? Should it matter if the cleric represents him or 
herself to the public by referring to him or herself as "doctor?" What if 
the cleric advertises his or her counseling abilities in the newspaper or 
through church literature? What if all these hypothetical factors were 
present, and the counselee was a fifteen-year-old minor who had en-
tered into the counseling relationship because she relied on the cleric's 
representation that the clergy could deal with suicide and severe emo-
tional problems like the counselee's? 
The scenario that these questions suggest is plausible. If a lawsuit 
ensues, jurors will judge whether the cleric has acted with reasonable 
care in the circumstances of his or her profession. If the cleric has not 
acted appropriately, he or she may face a judgment day sooner than he 
or she imagined. 
